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ABSTRACT 
Liberalism and communitarianism have figured prominently in discussions of how to govern forensic 
DNA typing and databasing (hereafter: forensic DNA practices). Despite the prominence of these two 
political philosophies and their underlying values, no studies have looked at the governance of 
forensic DNA practices in a non-democratic country governed by a communitarian logic. To fill this 
lacuna in the literature, this article will consider Singapore as an authoritarian state governed by a 
communitarian philosophy. Following the introduction, the article will highlight basic innovations 
and technologies of forensic DNA practices, and will articulate a liberal democratic version of Lynch 
and McNally’s (2009) “biolegality”. It goes on to consider briefly various (political) philosophies (i.e. 
liberalism and communitarianism) and law enforcement models (i.e. due process and crime control 
models). The main part of the article records the trajectory, and hence biolegal progress, of forensic 
DNA practices in Singapore, and compares it with trajectories in England and the USA. The article 
ends by summarizing some of the main findings. 
 
Keywords: Communitarianism, Liberalism, Crime control model, Law enforcement, Singapore, 
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1. Introduction
1
  
Forensic DNA profiling was developed in the mid-1980s, was soon heralded as the “ultimate 
identification scheme” by the influential geneticist Eric Lander (1989), and has been subsequently 
considered as the “gold standard” for identification and individualization by lawyers and others 
(Scheck et al 2000). Several jurisdictions, predominantly in (but not limited to) liberal democracies, 
adopted forensic genetic technologies and, in most cases, legislation to govern it aimed to control 
crime and serve justice in the late 1980s and henceforth (see Hindmarsh and Prainsack 2010; 
Krimsky and Simoncelli 2011). Legislative measures set provisions for, amongst other things, the 
conditions for obtaining bodily samples, the governance of DNA databases, and mechanisms for 
quality control of DNA profiling. Empirical research documented that the lines of development 
related to setting up DNA databases and the inclusion of suspects and convicts onto those digital 
repositories are comparable in many jurisdictions and has formed a “common trajectory” (Williams 
and Johnson 2008: 1). This common trajectory started with DNA typing being predominantly used as 
evidence to secure convictions and to clear the wrongfully accused. Subsequently, and following the 
establishment of DNA databases as well as development of new profiling technologies, DNA became 
an increasingly important mechanism providing intelligence to state agents involved in criminal 
investigation. A current development is that jurisdictions seek for mechanisms enabling the 
transnational exchange of DNA data held in national DNA databases. This trajectory of forensic 
genetics demonstrates a symbiotic relationship between biotech innovations and the law. Lynch and 
McNally (2009; see also Machado et al 2011; Lawless 2013) coined the concept “biolegality” to 
document this symbiotic relationship between science and law and to articulate how such 
technolegal progress redefines and renegotiates the criminal justice system, human rights, suspect 
bodies and the credibility of various forms of evidence. They contend that biolegal marked bodies 
are both “object and product of policing and forensic expertise” and have the “potential to expand” 
(Lynch and McNally 2009: 284). They argue that the notion of biolegality can also provide “broader 
insight into strains and adjustments that occur when a novel surveillance system is implanted in a 
liberal democracy” (Lynch and McNally 2009: 285, emphasis added). This contribution will provide a 
provisional account of biolegality in a jurisdiction that is governed according principles different to 
that of liberal democracy. 
Following the introduction of forensic genetics and laws to govern it, scholars from the social 
sciences, humanities and law have been addressing forensic DNA typing and databasing (hereafter: 
forensic DNA practices) and have generated a substantial body of literature. This work articulates 
inter alia that forensic DNA practices are subject to technical and legal controversy (Jasanoff 1998; 
Aronson 2007; Lynch et al 2008), that provisions may comprise violations of constitutional rights 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007; ECtHR 2008), that the value and efficacy of DNA databases 
remains unclear (Human Genetics Commission 2009; McCartney et al 2010), that DNA databases are 
                                                           
1
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a developing instrumentality for increased state surveillance (Williams and Johnson 2004), that 
minorities populate DNA databases disproportionately (Ossorio and Duster 2005; Skinner 2011), and 
that criminal investigative epistemologies in the forensic DNA era are subject to constant change 
(Williams and Johnson 2008). These studies can be said to counter the dominant, contemporary 
forensic genetic discourse that these technologies are beneficial to society per se.  
Despite these important studies, a large lacuna is present in the body of literature on forensic DNA 
practices: whilst all social scientific studies have focussed on liberal democratic jurisdictions (like the 
United States of America, United Kingdom, Norway or Portugal), social scientific knowledge about 
forensic genetic practices in other parts of the world (e.g. Saudi Arabia, China or Ukraine) is 
presently unavailable (see Heinemann et al 2012: 250; Jasanoff 2010).
2
 How those countries exactly 
implement and use forensic DNA practices is unknown. But that it differs becomes clear from a short 
and contemporary example.  
The authoritarian regime of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced in October 2009 that it was 
planning to compile a DNA database with profiles from all its 4.5 million residents (Youssef 2009).
3
 
As such, the UAE have not followed the common trajectory mentioned above. The aims of the 
population-wide database are to control crime and to identify victims of a possible future mass 
fatality. It is currently unclear whether or not legislation was, or has been passed, or, as following 
remarks of the prospective director of the DNA database in an interview (Youssef 2009), whether 
setting up such a population-wide DNA database could be decided as “security matter” in which case 
a security directive would render legislation unnecessary all together. It was estimated that the UAE 
forensic laboratory would be able to DNA type one million subjects a year, that the project would 
take a decade, and in January 2011 it was proclaimed that the authorities would commence 
gathering samples in 2012 (Dajani 2011). As the government of UAE does not adhere to principles 
like transparency and accountability of governance, more information about UAE’s efforts to build a 
population-wide DNA database is currently unavailable.  
Were these mechanisms in place, it would become possible to document whether: the UAE 
authorities will ask its citizenry to volunteer biological samples, or whether such sampling would be 
enforced using the strong arm of the law; whether the population-wide database applies to the elite 
as well, or to the less privileged, migrants and tourists only; in what class of punishable crimes police 
will start collecting crime scene samples; and what rights subjects will have if a match is found 
between his/her profile and a trace collected at a crime scene? All these tentative yet (presently) 
unanswerable questions are important as forensic DNA practices pose challenges for civil liberties 
and may disproportionally harm vulnerable populations (Cole 2007; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
                                                           
2
 An extensive search on the internet as well as various scholarly databases identified only two contributions 
on forensic genetics’ issues and practices in countries not located in the global north (including Australia and 
New Zealand). De Ungria and Jose (2010) document the Philippines’ experience regarding emerging forensic 
DNA practices, and Parven (2012) examines inter alia the forensic use of DNA information in a developing 
country, i.e. Bangladesh. 
3
 Following UAE in its decision, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Bermuda are said to also have proposed including 
their entire population in a national DNA database, see http://www.soros.org/voices/forensic-genetics-a-
global-human-rights-challenge (accessed 1 October 2012). Even the British ex-prime minister Tony Blair called 
for including every citizen in a forensic DNA database in 2006, see 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1532210/DNA-database-should-include-all.html# (accessed 17 
June 2013). 
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2007). Also, they may provide state agencies with novel and powerful mechanisms for increased 
surveillance and as such may further the asymmetrical power relations between subjects living in 
the UAE and its state agencies and its governing elite.  
This article is a first attempt to fill the abovementioned lacuna. It will do so by documenting the 
trajectory of Singaporean forensic DNA practices, and to compare this trajectory with the 
development of forensic DNA practices in England & Wales and the United States of America 
(hereafter: England and USA respectively). Comparing the trajectories of relevant biolegal progress 
in Singapore, England and the USA also takes account of their locations within two different political 
systems. England and the USA are considered full-fledged democracies yet Singapore is not. Where 
England and the USA respect human rights, Singapore is reported to violate basic civil rights.
4
 The 
question this article addresses is whether it is possible to discern a version of biolegal progress in 
Singapore which differs from liberal democratic biolegality? To answer this question, the article first 
considers the use of forensic DNA typing technologies in liberal democracies before discussing two 
sets of principles contributing to forensic DNA governance and practice. Details of Singapore and its 
forensic DNA practices are presented in the main section of the present article. This contribution 
ends with summarizing the main results and some reflections on them. 
 
2. Forensic DNA typing technologies in liberal democracies 
In the mid-1980s, Sir Alec J. Jeffreys and his co-workers invented a method for individualizing human 
biological material which they described as “DNA fingerprinting” (Jeffreys et al 1985). DNA 
fingerprint techniques were notorious for several analytical problems and interpretive complexities 
(Lander 1989), but many of these drawbacks were technically resolved in the mid-1990s when 
tandemly reiterated DNA sequences or Short Tandem Repeats (STRs) replaced the previously used 
DNA fingerprinting techniques. STR profiles had several advantages over DNA fingerprints. One of 
the most important traits being that STRs could be determined exactly and numerically. 
Consequently, STRs could be stored digitally and therefore set a condition of possibility for digitally 
uploading these profiles in forensic DNA databases. Because of the capacity of DNA databases to 
match DNA profiles obtained from crime scene traces (DNA traces) to DNA profiles from known 
individuals (DNA subject profiles), forensic genetics has not only been utilized as evidence in courts, 
but also provides the police with intelligence as subject profiles may match DNA traces originating 
unsolved crimes.  
As soon as STRs were considered as viable forensic markers, geneticists of the European DNA 
Profiling Group coordinated efforts to standardize (and validate) STRs throughout European nations. 
Their labour crystallized out in several recommendations to include specific STRs in DNA typing kits 
(e.g. Gill et al 2000). Recommendations were followed up by a multitude of stakeholders. First, 
biotech companies (e.g. Promega, Applied Biosystems) developed so-called ‘multiplex DNA typing 
systems’ incorporating validated STRs (and PCR, see below). Second, the Council of the European 
Union issued resolutions endorsing to further standardize STRs throughout the European Union 
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consequently enacting the European Standard Set (ESS) (EU Council 2009).
5
 And third, the USA 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) developed DNA database management software which includes 
the ESS; the FBI has also made the software freely available to other law enforcement authorities in 
the USA and beyond.
6
 It can therefore be concluded that forensic geneticists, policy makers, biotech 
companies and law enforcement officials made a concerted effort to standardize STRs globally 
(Prainsack and Toom 2013: 75).  
The invention of a technology to replicate biological material in vitro – usually called Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (PCR, see Mullis 1990; Rabinow 1996) – rendered it possible to do forensic DNA 
analysis on biological material other than blood and semen as was previously the case. This 
contributed to two new possibilities. First, DNA profiles could be provided from biological traces like 
saliva present on cigarette butts and soda cans or skin cells from clothes. Such items are often 
collected at scenes of less severe crimes (e.g. burglary, car theft) and hence the availability of PCR 
importantly added to forensic genetics’ capacity to be applied in the investigation of less severe 
criminal activities. Secondly, and connected to the first, blood of subjects was no longer required as 
equally reliable DNA profiles could now be determined from saliva. Taking a sample of saliva is, by 
many policy makers and other stakeholders, considered a less severe violation of one’s body and 
bodily integrity when compared to the mandatory taking of a blood sample. The availability of PCR 
hence importantly limited some of the ethical and legal concerns which surrounded the taking of 
subject samples.  
Forensic DNA practices as discussed so far aim to match traces collected at crime scenes to 
reference samples obtained from subjects; they are technologies for identification through 
individualization. In recent years, new genetic insights, the availability of large population genetic 
databases as well as technological innovations crystallized out in the application of DNA technologies 
aimed at clustering potential suspects (Cole and Lynch 2006; M’charek 2008; Toom 2012a). One 
application regards searching for possible familial relations between the unknown originator of a 
DNA trace and known subjects in the database (hereafter: familial searching).
7
 Familial searching is 
based on the fact that DNA profiles of biological families are statistically expected to be more similar 
than DNA profiles originating from two unrelated individuals. This knowledge can be used in criminal 
investigations where a DNA trace is uploaded to the database but does not match any other subject 
profile. A custodian may subsequently, and according legislative or regulatory provisions, search for 
similar yet not identical DNA profiles (hereafter: near matches) (c.f. Bieber et al 2006: 1315). If a 
near match between a crime scene sample and a subject profile already included in a database is 
identified, it may be possible that a sibling, parent or child of the known subject is the originator of 
the crime scene sample; it renders that specific family suspect. Yet since familial searching is based 
on statistics and shared genetic markers, there is also a significant chance that all members of the 
identified potentially suspect family are innocent and hence have nothing to do with the crime 
under investigation (Curran and Buckleton 2008).  
                                                           
5
 The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) applies the same set of STRs as ESS in their 
‘Interpol Standard Set of Loci’ (ISSOL). 
6
 See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis (accessed 26 September 2012).  
7
 Another set of technologies infers external visible characteristics (e.g. sex, age) or biographic ancestry (e.g. 
European, North African). These technologies are not discussed in this contribution as they are currently hardly 
utilized in law enforcement practices. For an introduction of such technologies, see Kayser and Schneider 
(2009); and for discussion, see M’charek et al (2012) and Toom (2012a).  
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This section succinctly documented how forensic DNA practices were first aimed at evidence and 
later also at producing intelligence; that these technologies were first used in severe and violent 
crimes, and later also in volume crimes; and that DNA typing technologies are not only aimed at 
individualizing subjects, but also at clustering potential suspects and suspect families. An additional 
development is that national forensic DNA practices are now also rendered in international practices 
given current transnational exchange programs (Bellanova 2008; McCartney et al 2011; Prainsack 
and Toom 2010, 2013). These four advances have all been documented in the development of 
forensic genetics in liberal democracies. Liberal democracy refers here to several issues. First, it is in 
this article considered a location, namely countries situated in (what is often called) the ’global 
north’. Second, liberal democracy refers to a political system to order a state adhering to standards 
like democratic institutions, rule of law, effective participation of the public, logic of equality, 
enlightened understanding of policy and its alternatives, and control over the political agenda (see 
Dahl 1998). Third, liberal democracy is in this article considered a political philosophy (i.e. liberalism) 
aimed at protecting individuals from too much interference by state agents through providing the 
former with individual rights which cannot be breached by the latter without democratically agreed 
upon rules. Consequently, forensic DNA typing technologies provided the conditions of possibility for 
these applications. In many jurisdictions it would however be legally impossible to apply these 
technologies in law enforcement practices since the use of such technologies is limited by inter alia 
individual rights, legal principles, particular understands of ethical conduct, and fiscal resources. To 
overcome such constraints, many national parliaments enacted forensic DNA typing laws and 
policies for the use of these technologies. Indeed, the resulting practices are liberal democratic 
articulations of biolegal progress. It is however interesting to note that the literature on the 
governance of forensic DNA practices often refers not only to liberalism, but also to 
communitarianism (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007; Human Genetics Commission 2009).
8
  
 
3. Sets of principles guiding governance and practice of forensic genetics 
Scholarly debates regarding the governance of forensic DNA practices commonly focus on one of 
two sets of principles. The first set of principles stems from a cautious attitude towards the state, its 
monopoly on the use of violence and institutions liable to utilize those powers (Fitzgerald and 
Ellsworth 1984: 33) which “results in the perceived need for institutionalized checks and balances” 
(Ho 2010: 244). To protect subjects against these powers, individual rights like liberty, autonomy and 
privacy are emphasized. Consequently this model will advocate a strong orientation towards so-
called ‘due process’ criminal justice practices in order to prevent innocent individuals being unfairly 
treated. The model leans heavily on the requirement for the state to prove guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt and emphasizes the presumption of innocence principle (Beyleveld 1997: 9; Ho 2010). The 
second set of principles assumes that the state and its institutions can be trusted to a great extent 
and hence it has a predisposition to assume that a strong state is the best guarantee for the 
‘common good’, sometimes defined as the greatest benefit for the greatest number. This second set 
of principles will be more inclined towards a ‘crime control’ model as a mechanism to deter or 
repress crime and to swiftly and efficiently administer justice to offenders (Fitzgerald and Ellsworth 
                                                           
8
 ‘Utilitarianism’ is also often mentioned as guiding principle to model forensic DNA practices, see Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2007; Human Genetics Commission 2009. 
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1984: 33-34; Beyleveld 1997: 8-9; Van Houdt and Schinkel 2013:14). Whereas the first set of 
principles favours individual rights, the second set stresses the collective good. The former is often 
associated with liberalism and the latter with (forms of) communitarianism (Beyleveld 1997; Etzioni 
2004, 2006; Van Houdt and Schinkel 2013).  
Since liberalism and due process on the one hand and communitarianism and crime control model 
on the other hand are two ideal types, there is always interplay of the positions in practice – they are 
simultaneously present (Van Houdt and Schinkel 2013). Yet accentuating either the liberalist-due-
process or the communitarian-crime-control-model set of principles will make a difference. For 
instance, sociologist and influential advocate of communitarianism Amitai Etzioni (2004: 201) rather 
naively remarked (or at least from an STS perspective) that “DNA usages will lead not only to more 
convictions, but also to fewer crimes being committed in the first place, which is the best of all 
worlds. In short, the benefits to public safety of DNA usages are very substantial.” In short, public 
safety, or so Etzioni argues, is regarded more important than protection of individual rights. From 
such position it is only a small step to argue for a population-wide DNA database to control crime 
(and additionally identify victims of disaster), as the example of the UAE population-wide DNA 
database demonstrates. Etzioni’s claim and the UAE project both show that the common good 
defined as controlling crime (potentially) trumps the individual, their rights and due process. In other 
jurisdictions, where individuals and due process are weighted more heavily than plain ‘safety’ or the 
‘war against crime’, forensic DNA practices may be rolled out more prudently such as in the USA or 
the Netherlands (Aronson 2010; Toom 2012b).  
 
4. Forensic DNA practices in Singapore 
The present contribution is the first (STS) article which addresses the history, legislation, trajectory, 
and utility of forensic DNA practices in a country not organized according liberal democratic ideals. 
More specifically, it will consider Singapore as an authoritarian state advocating communitarianism 
and pursuing the crime control model. The city state also makes an interesting case study to 
document biolegal progress as it has been the first jurisdiction implementing forensic DNA practices 
in the Southeast Asian region and hence provides a potential model for rolling out forensic DNA 
practices in other countries in that region. A third reason for studying Singapore is that its 
government is English speaking which renders all kinds of written documents accessible for research. 
In addition, government officials can be interviewed in English. Or at least, in ‘theory’; the ‘practice’ 
of considering Singapore as a case study proved to be extremely unruly which posed methodological 
challenges.  
A two-month research trip to Singapore (September and October 2011) was planned to collect 
relevant documents as well as to interview ten to fifteen officials of the Health Science Authorities, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Law, the Attorney-General’s Chambers, the Law Society, 
Supreme Court, Police Force and human rights organisations. I anticipated that interviews with 
officials would include (general) questions about legislation, operational activities including the 
national DNA database, the prospect of international cooperation, and ethical issues. The aim of 
these interviews would be to articulate how Singapore’s communitarian approach to governance 
and politics give shape and content to Singapore’s forensic DNA practices; furthermore, I considered 
these ‘moments of contact’ as opportunities to gather additional policy documents. In other words, 
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would it be possible to discern a communitarian version of Lynch and McNally’s (2009) liberal 
democratic concept “biolegality”? Yet what I severely underestimated was that officials in some 
jurisdictions do not adhere to governing principles like transparency and accountability. Or, as 
recently stated by criminologists Lee and Laidler (2013: 148), some Asian countries may be 
“reluctant to open the doors to researchers for cultural, political and economic reasons ... 
particularly [for] those with a critical perspective.” Such is also the case for Singapore, or, as I 
experienced, at least where it concerns questions about its law enforcement practices and human 
rights issues. In total, more than forty emails were sent to over twenty different officials which were 
followed by many more telephone calls. All officials asked for more information, but no one 
subsequently consented to being interviewed. As such, this article is based on publicly available 
resources including transcripts from Parliamentarian debates, legal provisions published in the 
Government Gazette, news items from the national news paper Straits Times, verdicts and 
jurisprudence, and official publications from Singapore’s government agencies. Consequently, this 
article documents the lines of development of Singapore’s forensic DNA practices, provisionally 
articulates how communitarianism shapes policy and governance of Singapore’s forensic DNA 
practices, and also considers how communitarian versions of biolegality became, in the case of 
Singapore, enacted through “technical developments, government legislation, policing practices and 
appeal court rulings” (Lynch and McNally 2009: 285).  
 
4.1 An authoritarian communitarian state 
Singapore, a city-state just north of the equator in the Southeast Asian region, is populated by 
approximately 5 million people. It is regarded a very prosperous state and safe country, scoring high 
in all lists that record the gross domestic product per capita and crime rates.
9
 On the other hand, the 
city-state performs poorly in several democratic and human rights lists. It is qualified as a “partly 
free” democracy and “authoritarian state” by the Freedom House Organisation and Human Rights 
Watch respectively. The USA Department of State reported that “preventive detention, infringement 
of citizens' privacy rights, restriction of speech and press freedom and the practice of self-censorship 
by journalists, restriction of freedoms of assembly and association, limited restriction of freedom of 
religion, and some trafficking in persons” are still urgent issues that need to be resolved.
10
 In 
addition, Amnesty International regularly reports that Singapore’s legal system still ill-treats 
prisoners, and that it tortures and executes convicted offenders.
11
 So according to human right and 
democratic indexes, Singapore does not qualify as a (liberal) democracy. This observation 
corresponds with conclusions by political scientists who classify Singapore as an “illiberal 
                                                           
9
 See for an overview: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29_per_capita 
(accessed 6 October 2012). Singapore had between a 0.3 and 0.6 homicide per 100,000 capita in the past 
decade according data of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, other statistical data ranks Singapore 
as 3
rd
 on the Numbeo.com ‘safety index’, and 6
th
 on the prosperity.com ‘safety and security index’, see 
respectively: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html; 
http://www.numbeo.com/quality-of-life/rankings_by_country.jsp; http://www.prosperity.com (accessed 3 
October 2012). 
10
 See http://www.freedomhouse.org, http://www.hrw.org/asia/singapore, and 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/136008.htm (accessed 9 October 2012). 
11
 http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/singapore/report-2011 (accessed 9 October 2012). 
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democracy” (Ortmann 2011: 153) and as a facade democracy in order to conceal “authoritarian 
governance” (Schedler 2009: 381).  
Asian values have been promoted as governing principles by Singapore’s governing elite. The former 
president Lee Kuan Yew argued in an interview that Eastern societies “believe that the individual 
exists in the context of his family. He is not pristine and separate. The family is part of the extended 
family, and then friends and the wider society” (quoted in Zakaria 1994: 113). As such, the individual 
is always implicated in the wider social network, in the community. Asian values foster a 
communitarian approach to policy and governance (c.f. O’Dwyer 2003: 42). This article will hence 
consider Singapore – as Singapore curtails individual rights and political liberties to maintain social 
order – as an “authoritarian communitarian” state (see Etzioni 2011: 17). This claim is further 
substantiated as official publications of Singapore’s government, statements of its elite and analyses 
of various scholars all indicate that Singapore applies communitarian principles to governance (see 
Zakaria 1994; Tan 2000: 102; Chua and Shing 2003: 211; Lee 2008: 356, 373). 
Apart from the political system being based on authoritarian forms of communitarianism, the 
underlying values of Singapore’s criminal justice system mirror, according a retired Attorney-General 
of Singapore and former Chief Justice of Singapore, the “crime control model” (Keong 2000: 28). The 
judiciary has been classified as “coldly efficient” (Siyuan and Chua 2010: 99), severely affecting the 
balance between due process and the crime control model, which “is struck by heavily weighting the 
crime control side of the scales with broadly defined criminal laws, which utilise presumptions 
against the accused and contain harsh punishments” (Siyuan and Chua 2010: 100). The lack of 
sufficient due process mechanisms has even been documented in capital cases (Hor 2004).
12
 The 
government has allegedly been willing to exchange “respect for ‘human rights’ for better crime 
control, to barter expensive, time consuming trial processes for the efficiency of administrative 
decisions” (Hor 2001: 28). In other words, the crime control model seems to be weighted heavier 
than due process mechanisms. As we will see below, Singapore’s authoritarian communitarian 
approach to policy and governance and its disposition to foregrounding the crime control model are 
conducive to a very restrictive forensic DNA practice. 
 
4.2 Introducing Singapore’s forensic DNA practices  
Singapore has been a regional forerunner in implementing and using forensic DNA typing. It set up a 
forensic DNA laboratory in 1990, and DNA evidence was accepted in Singaporean courts in 1991. 
DNA experts from Singapore’s Health Sciences Authority (HSA) assisted in efforts to identify the 
victims following the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Other officials have been involved in training forensic DNA analysts (and other practitioners) from 
the Southeast Asian region. It was also the first Southeast Asian country with specific forensic DNA 
legislation – the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act 2003 – and a national DNA database.  
The HSA Biology Division runs two laboratories: the DNA Profiling Laboratory, and the DNA Database 
Laboratory. Both laboratories meet all contemporary international standards and obtained 
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 Another example that demonstrates that Singapore’s judiciary is not impartial regards the conviction of 
research journalist Alan Shadrake in 2010 which verdict was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in 2011, see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/27/jail-singapore (accessed 5 November 2012).  
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accreditation from the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation 
Board (ASCLD/LAB) in 1996.
13
 Accreditation is aimed at demonstrating that a specific laboratory 
meets standards according to the ISO 17025 which apply to management, personnel, quality system, 
operational and technical procedures, equipment and physical facilities.
14
 So ‘trust’ – an essential 
element of communitarian governance (Beyleveld 1997; Etzioni 2004, 2006) – is partly distributed to 
procedural mechanisms. Accreditation does however not rule out that mistakes are being made as 
illustrated by a HSA announcement in January 2012: “The Health Sciences Authority (HSA) has 
initiated the re-test of the DNA samples of 87 criminal cases as a precautionary measure ... This re-
testing was initiated following HSA’s discovery that a reagent of higher than usual concentration 
(“the Reagent”) was prepared and used as part of the DNA testing process in its DNA Profiling 
Laboratory (DNAPL) from October 2010 to August 2011” (HSA 2012; see also AGC 2012). Following 
the announcement, Singapore’s Health minister Gan Kim Yong apologized for what was coined a 
“blunder” (Yuen 2012). Such may be regarded a motion of no confidence and hence detrimental for 
the public trust of Singapore’s citizenry in Singapore’s government in general and the HSA in 
particular.  
 A senior science writer of the national newspaper Straits Times observed that “[m]ost locals have 
great faith in the criminal justice system of Singapore” yet this error also proved that Singapore’s 
agents occasionally do make mistakes and hence the possibility of a miscarriage of justice “seems to 
have surfaced” (Ho 2012).
15
 Based on this conclusion, the science writer made a plea for 
implementing post-conviction DNA testing in Singapore. Another Straits Times writer praised the 
laboratory manager responsible for the error for reporting it to the management; this second writer 
also appreciated the HSA’s response for calling “all relevant government agencies to review the 
import of the mistake and take steps to rectify the wrong. This kind of personal and institutional 
integrity to admit wrongdoing and take steps to fix a wrong goes a long way to help the public 
maintain confidence in the HSA” (Khalik 2012). Contributors to online forums stressed that they also 
valued the response of the HSA and emphasized that HSA's admittance of the error would 
contribute to “inculcate a culture of not afraid of being transparent”.
16
 So apart from an appreciation 
of the HSA being transparent, the quoted (and many other) responses also articulated a general lack 
of transparency of Singapore’s institutions in general and law enforcement authorities in particular.  
 
4.3 Singapore’s trajectory: forensic DNA legislation and expansion of the database 
Although Singapore set up a forensic DNA laboratory in 1990, a legal framework for the routine 
application of DNA profiling was lacking until 2002 when the Singaporean government presented the 
                                                           
13
 http://www.hsa.gov.sg/publish/hsaportal/en/applied_sciences/Bio_Services.html (accessed 28 September 
2012).  
14
 ‘ISO’ stands for International Organization for Standardization, the organization was founded in 1947. For 
the body that accredited the HSA laboratory, see http://www.ascld-lab.org/ (accessed 3 October 2012). 
15
 Less than a year later, in March 2013, Singapore’s Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of a death row 
inmate based on a doubtful testimony of a police officer as well as the absence of DNA on any of the exhibits, 
see: http://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/category/dna/ and 
http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Crime/Story/A1Story20130310-407514.html (accessed 17 
June 2013).  
16
 See http://forums.vr-zone.com/chit-chatting/1902409-health-minister-gan-kim-yong-apologises-hsas-dna-
lab-error.html (accessed 3 October 2012).  
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“Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Bill”. This Bill provided legal provisions for (among other 
things) the taking of bodily samples, the setting up a national DNA database, and the removal of 
DNA profiles from the database. The Bill was read in October and December 2002 in Parliament and 
subsequently the “Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act” was published in the Singapore 
Government Gazette in December 2002. The Act commenced on February 13
th
, 2003 and stipulates 
the (mandatory) taking of body samples (blood, hair, saliva) of any individual who is “(a) arrested 
and accused of a crime; (b) is convicted of a crime; or (c) is serving his term of imprisonment in 
connection with a crime of which he has been convicted” (Republic of Singapore 2002). In addition, 
bodily samples for DNA profiling can also be obtained from individuals who are arrested and 
detained without a trial according the widely criticized “Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act”.
17
 
Apart from (mandatory) bodily sample collection, the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act 
sets provisions for individuals volunteering a sample when they were present at the scene of a crime 
(e.g. for elimination purposes) or when he or she is being questioned in connection with a crime (e.g. 
in a so-called ‘DNA mass screening’ where law enforcement authorities request people to volunteer 
a DNA sample in attempts to find a culprit).  
Singapore’s forensic national DNA database is owned by the Singapore Police Force; the HSA is in 
charge of its daily management. All DNA profiles obtained are uploaded onto the database. DNA 
profiles from acquitted or discharged suspects should be removed; originators of subject profiles 
who die or who reach the age of 100 should also be removed. Although the deletion of DNA profiles 
from the database from those arrested and accused of a crime but never convicted is required by 
the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act 2003, there are no provisions for destroying 
biological samples of innocent individuals. It is therefore assumed that a large collection of bodily 
samples of those considered innocent are retained indefinitely by the HSA. The decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case of S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom (ECtHR 2008) 
ruled it disproportionate and unnecessary in a democracy to indefinitely retain DNA profiles and 
biological samples (as well as fingerprints) of those individuals who were once arrested but never 
convicted of a crime. In other words, the indefinite retention of forensic bodily samples in Singapore 
from those considered innocent is regarded a disproportionate measure from a liberalist and human 
rights perspective.  
Having set the legal landscape, the next question to be answered regards the expansion of 
Singapore’s DNA database. Unfortunately, the registrar of the database does not regularly provide 
public available data about size and structure of the database.
18
 Upon commencement of the 
Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act in February 2003, the HSA received 14,000 blood 
samples from all prisoners, these samples were subsequently DNA typed and uploaded to the DNA 
database (Tan-Siew et al 2007). This number further increased to 37,000 in September 2004, 53,000 
in December 2007, 100,000 in October 2009 and 180,000 samples in January 2012 (see 
Parliamentary Debates 2004; Dee 2007; Quek 2009; Ho 2012). Based on these figures, and taking 
into account that the total population of Singapore amounted to 5,312,400 in 2012, 3.89% of those 
                                                           
17
 The Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act has been termed the “crime control model par excellence” (Hor 
2001: 29; see also Ho 2010) 
18
 See Hor (2001: 38, 39) for another example of Singapore’s government being deficient in providing 
information about the criminal justice system, in particular information regarding capital and corporeal 
punishment.  
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subjects liable for DNA typing were included to the national forensic DNA database in early 2012.
19
 
In figure 1, available data with regard to Singapore’s DNA database is summarized, also added are 
basic statistics of the National DNA Database of England and Wales (NDNAD) and the USA national 
DNA database, the Combined DNA Index (CODIS).
20
 
Figure 1: Basic statistics of Singapore’s national DNA database, NDNAD and CODIS 
 Singapore England/NDNAD USA/CODIS 
Total population 5,312,400 53,700,000 314,455,000 
DNA database launch 2003 1995 1998
21
 
Total of persons in the DNA database 180,000 5,570,284 11,091,500 
Proportion of population in database 3.89% 10.4% 3.5% 
Total of traces Unknown 386,841 447,300 
Total of DNA profiles in database Unknown 5,756,513 11,538,800 
Total of stain-person matches Unknown 409,715 187,700 
Stain-person matches per person
22
 Unknown 0.074  0.017  
Proportion of traces of total amount Unknown 6.72% 3.88% 
 
Based on these figures, some provisional inferences can be drawn regarding the uploading of subject 
profiles in Singapore. First, the size of Singapore’s database relative to its population currently is 
smaller than the NDNAD and similar to CODIS. Second, since Singapore’s database went live in 2003 
and the NDNAD and CODIS in 1995 and 1998 respectively, the former expanded much faster than 
CODIS yet slower than the NDNAD.
23
 Concerns over “liberty and privacy” in the USA have 
importantly contributed to the relative slow expansion of CODIS (Aronson 2010: 257) and hence may 
be considered an articulation of a liberal democratic biolegality.
24
 In contrast, the regimes for 
inclusion in England have been termed the “end of innocence” (Williams and Johnson 2008: 87) 
which provide a rational for the substantial relative size of the NDNAD. The end of innocence-claim 
was acknowledged in the abovementioned S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom judgement of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR 2008). It rendered the English practice of indefinitely 
retaining DNA profiles and bodily samples (as well as fingerprints) of those considered legally 
innocent unlawful. The coalition government subsequently drafted the Protection of Freedoms Bill 
which came in force in 2012 (McCartney 2012; Toom 2012b), thereby reinstalling measures aimed at 
                                                           
19
 http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/people/hist/popn.html (accessed 28 September 2012).  
20
 http://www.npia.police.uk/en/13338.htm; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (accessed 
10 October 2012). 
21
 CODIS is both a standardized software tool and a mechanism that connects all State DNA databases in 
national network. Although CODIS went live in 1998 there is a lot of variation in establishing State DNA 
databases throughout the US, see Krimsky and Simoncelli (2011).  
22
 These proportions are calculated by dividing ‘total of stain-person matches’ with ‘total of persons in the 
database’: England & Wales 


; US: 


. 
23
 These inferences are based on a simple estimation of the proportion of the population added per year on 
average since the launch of each national database: Singapore: 0.432 per annum (3.89/9y); England: 0.588 per 
annum (10/17y); US: 0.25 per annum (3.5/14y).  
24
 CODIS is likely to expand faster since the recent Maryland v. King judgement of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. It was decided that obtaining arrestee’s DNA is a legitimate procedure under the Fourth 
Amendment: “When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold a suspect for a serious 
offense and bring him to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the 
arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment” (Supreme Court of the United States 2013).  
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protecting individuals and hence shifting towards a liberal democratic and due process approach. 
Consequently, data of more than 1 million innocent persons must be removed.
25
 Once these profiles 
are cleared from the NDNAD it will still hold the largest proportion of a national population in a 
liberal democracy. Although liberal democratic biolegality is conducive to a proportional forensic 
DNA practice, the pre-Marper situation demonstrates that it is a thin line between proportionate 
and disproportionate interferences with subjects’ rights.  
It is hard to predict exactly how large Singapore’s database will become due to the lack of available 
information. This is a problematic issue when considered from a communitarian perspective. For 
instance, Etzioni (2006: 215) argues that “the good communitarian society has two key elements: a 
carefully crafted balance between liberty and the common good as well as between individual rights 
and social responsibilities, and a social order based as much as possible on moral persuasion as 
opposed to coercion” (emphasis added). He continues to argue that especially the second element – 
the need for moral persuasion concerning policy measures – is quintessential for what he terms the 
good communitarian society. More specifically, he contends that the basis for “legal, policy and 
ethical deliberations ... needs to be and can be found most effectively through dialogue” (Etzioni 
2006: 215). Dialogue is only possible if sufficient information on a policy issue is publicly available. 
Since the Singaporean authorities do not provide such information routinely, and since they do not 
consent to being interviewed on governance and practice of forensic genetics, it is impossible for the 
government to morally persuade the citizenry about the best way to roll out forensic DNA practices; 
it is a biolegality defined by the absence of moral persuasion. The performance of DNA databases is 
a recurrent topic that has spurred much debate (e.g. Human Genetics Commission 2009; McCartney 
et al 2010). Challenges that hinder assessments of DNA databases on its own or in combination with 
other databases include inter alia various national legal frameworks, different regimes for removing 
subject and trace profiles, various definitions of ‘hits’ and ‘matches’ and how they are counted, how 
‘matches’ are followed up, how many ‘matches’ result in a verdict, or whether the crime would have 
been detected without DNA (see further ENFSI 2012). However, and despite these and other 
challenges, measurements are possible. One performance indicator, as advocated by the influential 
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), is the so-called “stain-person matches per 
person” (‘total of stain-person matches’ divided by ‘total of persons’, see ENFSI 2012). This measure 
requires information about the total number of DNA subject profiles and DNA traces in a database 
and the amount of matches generated by comparing them. Unfortunately the HSA does not make 
such data publicly accessible and hence it is impossible to compare the performance of Singapore’s 
DNA database with that of the NDNAD or CODIS (0.074 and 0.017 respectively, see figure 1). Hence 
Singapore’s governance of the database is also deficient in Etzioni’s first key element: the balance 
between liberty and the common good. This balance can only be evaluated if performance outcomes 
of the DNA database are available. In one occasion the HSA reported that DNA matches had 
contributed to solving 350 crimes since the database launch in 2003 (Quek 2009). Solving 350 crimes 
through a DNA match is not an insignificant result yet when compared with the NDNAD and CODIS 
stain-person-matches – 409,715 and 187,700 respectively – it is an outright poor outcome. One can 
only hypothesize about the reason for the produced matches lagging behind in the specified period. 
The most likely explanation is that Singapore’s national DNA database lacks a balanced ratio 
between subject profiles and DNA traces. This hypothesis is backed-up by a comparative and partly 
quantitative study which suggests it is likely “that a more effective means of increasing hit rates is to 
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 http://www.genewatch.org/sub-570225 (accessed 6 November 2012).  
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increase the number of crime-scene profiles uploaded into the database rather than continue to add 
more suspects and arrestees (and convicts to lesser crimes) to the database net. The latter does 
improve the hit rate somewhat, but the former improves it much more” (Goulka et al 2010: 20; see 
also Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007: xvi). Put differently, if authorities want to increase hit rates 
they need not only upload subject samples, but also invest in collecting DNA traces at crime scenes.  
If this hypothesis is true, three possible explanations may provide insight into the imbalance of the 
ratio subject profiles and DNA traces. First, since crime rates are low in Singapore it may result in 
only very few DNA traces collected at crime scenes. Second, most criminal cases are being solved 
and hence the database has a very small proportion of DNA traces (as DNA traces of solved crimes 
are typically removed from the database after a case is closed). Third, law enforcement authorities 
embrace a forensic DNA practice focused at including a substantial part of the population in the 
national DNA database instead of collecting DNA traces at crime scenes aimed at achieving a 
balanced ratio between subject profiles and DNA traces. Whereas the first hypothesis would 
challenge a further expansion of the DNA database since there are not so many crimes being 
committed, the two subsequent explanations would fit Singapore’s law enforcement authorities 
embracing forensic DNA practice to subject a large proportion of its citizenry to genetic surveillance 
as a mechanism to control crime. 
 
4.4 Near matches and familial searching 
The abovementioned trajectory of forensic DNA practices refers not only to inclusion regimes to the 
database, but also to forensic DNA technologies’ applications. As documented in section 2, new 
interpretive schemas for DNA typing are available. One such application, searching for near matches 
as a proxy for a biological relation between a DNA trace and a subject profile (i.e. familial searching), 
has been utilized in criminal enquiries in Singapore and will be discussed here.  
The Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act 2003 does not forbid searching for near matches or 
utilizing familial searching yet the extent to which Singapore’s law enforcement authorities use this 
mechanism is currently unknown. But that searching for near matches and familial searching has 
occurred becomes clear from two empirical sources. The first concerns a judgement of the Court of 
Appeal (2011) which reports about an old lady who was found murdered in her flat in 2005. A man 
was arrested and soon confessed responsibility. If murder is proven in Singapore, the mandatory 
punishment is the death penalty. DNA typing proved to be enormously potent in this case for two 
reasons. One, the DNA profile of the suspect did not match traces recovered from the victim and 
hence DNA typing contributed to clearing his involvement in this capital crime. Two, although the 
suspect’s DNA profile did not match the DNA trace it revealed some remarkable similarities. Similar 
yet not identical DNA profiles may indicate a biological relationship between the originator of the 
trace and the subject whose DNA profile is compared with the trace. A HSA DNA analyst 
subsequently notified the police about the near match, and informed them that a sibling of the 
suspect possibly was the originator of the crime scene trace (Court of Appeal 2011). Based on these 
findings, the brother of the first suspect was arrested and convicted for the homicide. Since the 
court did not question the HSA analyst’s conduct of informing the police about the near match, it 
should hence be concluded that this form of familial searching is legally allowed in Singapore. Apart 
from coincidental near matches, the HSA has been utilizing algorithms to search the database for 
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potential biological relatives as was reported in a recent HSA annual report: “The DNA Database 
Laboratory scored a first in the use of a new genetic algorithm, familial searching, in the tracing of a 
murder suspect through his relatives in the criminal database” (HSA 2011: 60). Any further 
information about the specifics of this investigation and court proceedings are currently unavailable. 
While further information regarding familial searching or reporting near matches is publicly 
unavailable, policy arrangements in England and the USA will shortly be considered to shed light on 
the various familial searching policy arrangements.  
Familial searching policies or regulations are quintessential as the “nature of familial searching 
means that most if not all of the families nominated by the list will have no involvement in the crime 
in question” (Curran and Buckleton 2008: 164; see also Haimes 2006; Williams and Johnson 2006; 
Murphy 2010). It is for several technical and social, ethical, legal and fiscal reasons that the English 
police, the NDNAD strategy board and forensic science providers have been developing regulations 
and protocols to mitigate potential societal threats, as well as carefully manage familial searching in 
criminal enquiries (Home Office 2006). The USA has a comparable mode of regulating familial 
searching. Currently, familial searching is only allowed in California, Colorado, Texas and Virginia. 
These States apply protocols for familial searching in their individual State DNA databases in 
unsolved cases if all leads are exhausted.
26
 A pending Bill called “Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve 
Cold Cases Act of 2011” will, if it gets accepted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
USA, allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct “familial searches for DNA samples 
collected from crime scenes in State investigations” when no identical DNA matches were obtained 
in (attempts) of murder, manslaughter, and sexual abuse (USA Congress 2011). Were the Bill 
enacted, it thus allows for conducting familial searches utilizing CODIS instead of the individual State 
DNA databases. A significant advantage of a full-fledged legislation for governing familial searching – 
which was commenced in the Netherlands in April 2012 (Toom 2012b) and possibly becomes 
enacted in the USA – is that it renders these practices more transparent and thus contributes to 
making accountable law enforcement agencies and agents as well as policy makers.
27
 The absence of 
adherence to any of these principles, as well as the unavailability of any further information or rules 
for this application significantly limits legitimacy and acceptability of familial searching in Singapore.  
 
4.5 Forensic DNA practices in the Southeast Asian region 
“In this age of globalization, cooperation and collaboration between regional countries becomes of 
utmost important. This is particularly where crimes and criminal activities are no longer limited by 
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 Protocols can be downloaded at: http://www.denverda.org/dna/Familial_DNA_Database_Searches.htm 
(accessed 8 November 2012). 
27
 Such will even more be the case if the Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve Cold Cases Act of 2011 becomes 
enacted, as the Bill proposes the legal requirement to report on familial searching annually. The report should 
be submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the Senate, the minimum requirements for such report are proposed to include: “(1) The number 
of familial searches requested by CODIS State administrators or State attorney generals. (2) The number of 
familial searches conducted under this section. (3) The number of familial matches found as a result of such 
searches. (4) The status of any case in which such a familial match was found” (US Congress 2011). In addition 
to this information, sound assessment of familial searching practices with regard to its proportionality 
necessarily requires information about the total amount of investigations against persons and families, 
interrogations of these ‘persons and families of interest’, and arrests of suspect persons and families.  
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the physical borders.”
28
 Such reads the introduction of the website of the Asian Forensic Sciences 
Network (AFSN), which became established in 2008 by representatives of forensic science institutes 
from Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. In subsequent years, forensic 
science institutes of Indonesia, South Korea, Laos, and China also became AFSN members. Apart 
from Singapore, only South Korea is reported as having a forensic DNA database (INTERPOL 2008). 
However, Southeast Asian jurisdictions like Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand already 
have forensic DNA laboratories and are in the process of setting up national DNA databases. For 
example, pending in the Philippines is a legal framework for the governance of forensic DNA 
practices (the ”DNA Analysis Enhancement Act of 2010”, for further discussion see De Ungria and 
Jose 2010), and Malaysia, after years of postponing it, enacted its “Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) 
Identification Regulations” on 1 September 2012. The latter governs among others Malaysia’s 
forensic DNA databank.
29
 In addition to these two jurisdictions, Thailand, Brunei and Indonesia all 
stated that they desire a DNA database yet no public available documents indicate that they have 
succeeded thus far.
30
  
Based on these national efforts and the AFSN’s commitment to furthering regional cooperation and 
collaboration as well as the standardized DNA typing kits which are being utilized all over the world 
and digitally managed with the aforementioned CODIS software, it is assumed that AFSN members 
are considering the possibility of transnational exchange of DNA data in the short or mid-term 
future. Least to say that Singapore makes an interesting ‘partner’ for such exchange as it has a high 
influx of foreign labour who may commit crimes in Singapore but never were arrested. And given the 
substantial national database of Singapore, the neighbouring countries shall be interested to search 
the Singapore database for matches with known individuals.  
Transnational exchange of DNA data can be achieved through various mechanisms. A first such 
mechanism was launched in 2005 by INTERPOL when it set up the ‘DNA Gateway’. The DNA Gateway 
is a centrally administered ‘stand-alone’ database to which INTERPOL member countries can 
voluntarily upload DNA profiles from subjects, traces, missing persons and unidentified bodies 
(INTERPOL 2011; McCartney et al 2011). Another model for the exchange of DNA profiles is the so-
called Prüm Decision, which became effective in 2008 and is aimed at enhancing cross-border 
cooperation in the EU, “particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal 
migration” (EU Council 2008; Prainsack and Toom 2010, 2013). An important trait of the Prüm 
Decision is that it is European Union legislation which can and will be enforced by the European 
Union upon the member countries. Another aspect of the Prüm regime is that the exchange occurs 
on a daily basis and is fully automatic. A pitfall of the Prüm Decision was that European Union 
Parliament as well as national Parliaments of member states were sidestepped when it was decided 
to adopt the Prüm regime; it has consequently been criticized as lacking legitimacy, transparency 
and acceptability (Bellanova 2008; McCartney et al 2011). Inspired by the Prüm Decision, the USA 
currently seeks bilateral agreements in the “Agreement on Preventing and Combating of Serious 
                                                           
28
 http://www.asianforensic.net/background.html (accessed 8 November 2012). 
29
 http://iplawmalaysia.com/legislation/deoxyribonucleic-acid-dna-identification-regulations-2012-179.html 
(accessed 4 October 2012). 
30
 Evidence was found that Thailand commenced its “DNA Identification Act of 2010” on 1 January 2012 (see 
http://www.thai-senate.com/senate_inter/upload-download/translation/show_file.php?id=169, accessed 8 
November 2012). However, no further reference to this law or a Thai DNA database has been identified.  
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Crimes” with individual jurisdictions by making accessible biometrical data, including DNA, held on 
national databases.
31
  
If member states of AFSN decide that transnational exchange of DNA data is viable, and if this is 
supported by the various governments, than they may decide to model transnational exchange in 
the Southeast Asian region according to the Prüm model (automatic, obligatory), the INTERPOL 
model (analogue, voluntarily) or a mixture of both systems. It remains to be seen whether or not 
Singapore and the other Southeast Asian countries will decide to commence transnational DNA 
exchange routinely. Before any decision would be made, AFSN members should be encouraged to 
not only look at mechanisms for transnational exchange, but also advocate further discussion to 
convince several national constituencies and other stakeholders about the (perceived) necessity for, 
and legitimacy and acceptability of, transnational exchange. In this process of moral and factual 
persuasion, organisational principles like due process, individual rights, transparency and 
accountability will certainly add to making a compelling argument for transnational DNA exchange. 
Such process of persuasion is only meaningful if more information about inter alia transnational 
crime in the Southeast Asian region, the various rules for inclusion in databases, and quality and 
democratic control of exchange becomes available.  
 
5. Trumping communitarianism 
Liberalism and communitarianism have figured prominently in discussions how to govern forensic 
DNA practices. Despite the prominence of these two political philosophies and their underlying 
values, no studies have looked at the governance of forensic DNA practices in a country governed 
according a communitarian logic. To fill this lacuna in the literature, this article considered Singapore 
as a country governed according such logic. Etzioni (2006: 215) advocates the “good communitarian 
society” which is characterized by a conscientious weighing of rights of the individual and communal 
needs as well as that the community should be morally persuaded and subsequently accept that 
balance. 
On first sight, individual rights and communal needs in Singapore’s forensic DNA practices are 
‘balanced’ not least since Singapore rolled out forensic DNA practices in quite similar ways as liberal 
democratic countries. Yet Singapore’s government is rolling out forensic DNA practices at a much 
faster pace: early 2012, Singapore’s national DNA database already contained a similar proportion of 
its population when compared with the American CODIS yet achieved this in a shorter time span; it 
was also demonstrated that Singapore’s DNA database may outgrow the English NDNAD eventually. 
Furthermore, Singapore is regarded one of the safest countries in the world, consequently having 
(statistically) fewer subjects whose DNA would potentially be included in a criminal database. The 
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 Agreements were made between the US and (at least) Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Czech, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Spain, Estonia, Greece, Denmark and South Korea. These agreements still have to be 
ratified by the national Parliaments – it is currently unknown if and when the agreements come into force, see 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-ag-1212.html (accessed 10 October 2012). The Dutch 
Parliament currently considers the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Government of the United States of America on enhancing cooperation in preventing and combating 
serious crime, see https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/33603/trb-2010-321.html and 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/33603 (accessed 12 June 2013).  
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most logical explanation for Singapore’s rather quick expanding DNA database is hence that 
inclusion criteria are very broadly formulated, and that law enforcement officials have embraced a 
policy of swabbing a considerable part of the population.
32
 Hence, based on these provisional 
interpretations, and in comparison with the USA and England, Singapore’s approach to policy and 
governance of forensic DNA practices is communitarian as it is favouring the common good and 
social responsibility over liberty and individual rights. It is however debatable whether or not its 
inclusion regime, at least from a liberal democratic point of view, is imbalanced and disproportional.  
Etzioni’s second yardstick leaves less room for discussion and interpretation. Although the very 
restrictive rules for inclusion in Singapore’s DNA database were accepted after Parliamentarian 
scrutiny, exact data about current practice have never been published or made available publicly: it 
is unknown how many subject profiles are uploaded annually, how many profiles of cleared suspects 
were removed, how many juveniles are included in the database, how many crime scene profiles are 
uploaded annually, in how many cases the database provides investigative leads and how many of 
those leads lead to a successful prosecution. Furthermore, it is currently unknown how data in the 
database is applied exactly, and for what other purposes the database and forensic biobank are 
being utilized. Applications and purpose are important here, not only since familial searching and 
transnational exchange are controversial, but also because the forensic biobank – containing DNA 
samples of everyone arrested after 2003 – may be used for scientific research or even biomedical 
research; such would be a gross violation of bioethical values. Echoing the concept of biolegality 
(Lynch and McNally 2009; Lawless 2013), these instances articulate only the bio without legality.  
Summarizing the above, it can be concluded that Singapore’s government is deficient in providing 
any meaningful information about its forensic DNA practices. Second, the government is unwilling to 
adhere to governing principles like transparency and accountability. Third, and related to the former, 
Singapore’s citizenry cannot be persuaded about a balanced forensic DNA practice where individual 
rights (privacy, bodily integrity) are made secondary to the common good in narrowly defined and 
agreed upon circumstances. And fourth, some applications and purposes may be practiced without 
designated legislation rendering it into extra-legal practices. It is therefore safe to say that forensic 
DNA practices in Singapore are not so much governed according versions of communitarianism. 
Instead, communitarianism is trumped by the crime control model; the common good is defined as 
‘safety’ and the ‘war against crime and terrorism’ at the expense of individual rights (i.e. privacy, 
bodily integrity) and legal principles (i.e. proportionality, presumption of innocence, and onus of 
proof). In contrast with liberal democratic articulations of biolegality, which are intimately 
connected with civil liberties and restrictions to those liberties in accordance with a nation’s Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Toom 2012b), Singapore’s biolegality may be considered an articulation of the 
Penal Code and its policing practices. In other words, the latter’s biolegal progress is by and large 
steered by a list of punishable crimes whereas the former are the result of exceptions to individual 
rights.  
This article favours a liberalist and due process governance model for forensic DNA practices. Yet it 
remains an open question under what situated conditions subjects living in a state where forensic 
DNA practices are governed according the crime control model find themselves empowered or 
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disempowered by DNA typing technologies (see Prainsack and Toom 2010). Were any scholars to 
conduct further research into forensic DNA practices in countries other than liberal democracies, 
then a focus on specific groups (e.g. minorities, refugees, inmates) disproportionately affected by 
these technologies may overcome the unwillingness of government officials to share knowledge of 
the effects of their forensic DNA regimes (c.f. Cole 2007; Prainsack and Kitzberger 2009; Machado et 
al 2011; Machado and Prainsack 2012). Centre staging groups, and documenting under what 
circumstances such groups feel empowered or disempowered exactly by a state’s apparatus may 
bring to the fore how individuals’ bodies are being subjected by science and law, how subjectivities 
are produced and become enacted, or how surveillance may be resisted or used to one’s advantage. 
Such further studies should not only consider forensic DNA technologies, but also examine how 
those states and their governance principles and mechanisms contribute to the ordering of power 
relations between the state and its subjects. Another significant issue regards trust, in particular how 
trust is engaged by those who promote crime control values at the expense of due process ones? Or 
do Singaporeans not so much trust law enforcement agencies and instead rely on forensic DNA 
typing technologies which, in this era of forensic fictions like CSI: Crime Scene Investigation and 
Bones, are often perceived as infallible truth machines with the capacity to correct an unduly 
powerful state utilizing the crime control model? It may be possible that Singapore’s citizenry finds it 
comforting that forensic DNA typing technologies’ epistemological authority stands between them, 
the state, and the crime control model.  
 
References 
AGC 2012. Press Release 3 January: Laboratory incident affecting results of DNA testing. Singapore: 
Attorney-General's Chambers. 
Aronson, J. 2007. Genetic Witness. Science, Law, and Controversy in the Making of DNA Profiling. 
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Aronson, J. D. 2010. "On trial! Governing forensic DNA technologies in the United States." in 
Hindmarsh, R. and Prainsack, B. (eds.), Genetic Suspects. Global Governance of Forensic DNA 
Profiling and Databasing, 240-261. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bellanova, R. 2008. "The ‘Prüm Process’’: The Way Forward for EU Police Cooperation and Data 
Exchange." in Guild, E. and Geyer, F. (eds.), Security Versus Justice? Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
the European Union, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. 
Beyleveld, D. 1997. "Ethical issues in the forensic application of DNA analysis." Forensic Science 
International 88: 3-15. 
Bieber, F. R., Brenner, C. and Lazer, D. 2006. "Finding criminals through DNA of their relatives." 
Science 312: 1315-1316. 
Chua, L. J. and Shing, K. 2003. "Saying No: Sections 377 and 377A of the Penal Code." Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies: 209-261. 
Accepted for publication in East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal, to appear in 2014. 
20 
 
Cole, S. A. 2007. "How much justice can technology afford? The impact of DNA technology on equal 
criminal justice." Science and Public Policy 34: 95-107. 
Cole, S. A. and Lynch, M. 2006. "The social and legal construction of suspects." Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science 2: 39-60. 
Court of Appeal 2011. Muhammad bin Kader and another v Public Prosecutor, SGCA 32, Criminal 
Appeal No 8 of 2009. Singapore: Court of Appeal. 
Curran, J. M. and Buckleton, J. S. 2008. "Effectiveness of familial searches." Science & Justice 84: 164-
167. 
Dahl, R. A. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 
Dajani, H. 2011. "Forensic evidence traps more criminals in UAE (18 January)." The National. 
De Ungria, M. C. and Jose, J. M. 2010. "Forensic DNA profiling and databasing: the Philippines 
experience." in Hindmarsh, R. and Prainsack, B. (eds.), Genetic Suspects. Global Governance of 
Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dee, S. T. 2007. "53,000 Samples in DNA Database (December 28)." Straits Times. 
ECtHR 2008. Case of S. and Marper v the United Kingdom, Applications nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 
4 December. Strasbourg: European Court of Human Rights. 
ENFSI 2012. DNA Database Management. Review and Recommendation. Europe: European Network 
of Forensic Science Institutes. 
Etzioni, A. 2004. "DNA tests and DNA databases in criminal justice: individual rights and the common 
good." in Lazer, D. (ed.), DNA and the Criminal Justice System. The Technology of Justice, Cambridge; 
London: The MIT Press. 
Etzioni, A. 2006. "A Communitarian Approach: A viewpoint on the study of the legal, ethical and 
policy considerations raised by DNA tests and databases." The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 34: 
214-221. 
Etzioni, A. 2011. "Authoritarian versus responsive communitarian bioethics." Journal of Medical 
Ethics 37: 17-23. 
EU Council 2008. "Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, of 23 June 2008, on the stepping up of cross-
border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime." Official Journal of 
the European Union L210: 1-11. 
EU Council 2009. "Council Resolution of 30 November 2009 on the exchange of DNA analysis results 
(2009/C 296/01)." Official Journal of the European Union 52: 1-31. 
Fitzgerald, R. and Ellsworth, P. 1984. "Due process vs. crime control." Law and Human Behavior 8: 
31-51. 
Accepted for publication in East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal, to appear in 2014. 
21 
 
Gill, P., Sparkes, R., Fereday, L. and Werrett, D. J. 2000. "Report of the European Network of Forensic 
Science Institutes (ENSFI): formulation and testing of principles to evaluate STR multiplexes." 
Forensic Science International 108: 1-29. 
Goulka, J., Matthies, C., Disley, E. and Steinberg, P. 2010. Toward a Comparison of DNA Profiling and 
Databases in the United States and England. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
Haimes, E. 2006. "Social and ethical issues of familial searching in forensic investigations: Insights 
from family and kinship studies." Journal of Medicine, Law and Ethics 34: 263-276. 
Heinemann, T., Lemke, T. and Prainsack, B. "Risky profiles: societal dimensions of forensic uses of 
DNA profiling technologies." New Genetics and Society 31: 249-258. 
Hindmarsh, R. and Prainsack, B. (eds.) 2010. Genetic Suspects. Global Governance of Forensic DNA 
Profiling and Databasing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ho, A. 2012. "The case for post-conviction DNA testing (January 14)." The Straits Times. 
Ho, H. L. 2010. "Liberalism and the criminal trial." Sydney Law Review 32: 243-256. 
Home Office 2006. Tactical Advice. Using Familial DNA Intelligence Products in Serious Crime 
Investigations. London: Home Office. 
Hor, M. 2001. "Singapore's Innovations to Due Process." Criminal Law Forum 12: 25-40. 
Hor, M. 2004. "The death penalty in Singapore and international law." Singapore Year Book of 
International Law 8: 105-117. 
HSA 2011. Transformation Through Synergy. Health Science Authority Annual Report 2010/11. 
Singapore: Health Sciences Authority. 
HSA 2012. Press Release 3 January: HSA Re-tests DNA Cases As A Precautionary Measure. Singapore: 
Health Sciences Authority. 
Human Genetics Commission 2009. Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear? Balancing Individual Rights 
and the Public Interest in the Governance and Use of the National DNA Database. London: Human 
Genetics Commission. 
INTERPOL 2008. Interpol Global DNA Profiling Survey. Lyon: INTERPOL. 
INTERPOL 2011. DNA Profiling - Fact Sheet. Lyon: INTERPOL. 
Jasanoff, S. 1998. "The eye of everyman: witnessing DNA in the Simpson trial." Social Studies of 
Science 28: 713. 
Jasanoff, S. 2010. "Foreword." in Hindmarsh, R. and Prainsack, B. (eds.), Genetic Suspects. Global 
Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing, xix-xxiv. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Jeffreys, A. J., Wilson, V. and Thein, S. L. 1985. "Hypervariable 'minisatelite' regions in human DNA." 
Nature 314: 67-73. 
Accepted for publication in East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal, to appear in 2014. 
22 
 
Kayser, M. and Schneider, P. M. 2009. "DNA-based prediction of human externally visible 
characteristics in forensics: motivations, scientiﬁc challenges, and ethical considerations." Forensic 
Science International: Genetics 3: 154-161. 
Keong, C. S. 2000. "Rethinking the Criminal Justice System of Singapore for the 21st Century." 
Singapore Academy of Law, 29-58. Singapore. 
Khalik, S. 2012. "To err is human, to confess remarkable (5 January)." The Straits Times. 
Krimsky, S. and Simoncelli, T. 2011. Genetic Justice. DNA Databanks, Criminal Investigations, and Civil 
Liberties. . New York: Columbia University Press. 
Lander, E. S. 1989. "DNA fingerprinting on trial." Nature 339: 501-505. 
Lawless, C. J. 2013. "The low template DNA profiling controversy: Biolegality and boundary work 
among forensic scientists." Social Studies of Science 43: 191-214. 
Lee, M. and Laidler, K. J. 2013. "Doing criminology from the periphery: Crime and punishment in 
Asia." Theoretical Criminology 17: 141-157. 
Lee, Y. C. L. 2008. "'Don't Ever Take a Fence Down Until You Know the Reason it Was Put Up' - 
Singapore Communitarianism and the Case for Conserving 377A." Singapore Journal of Legal Studies: 
347-394. 
Lynch, M., Cole, S., McNally, R. and Jordan, K. 2008. Truth Machine. The Contentious History of DNA 
Fingerprinting. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Lynch, M. and McNally, R. 2009. "Forensic DNA databases: the co-production of law and surveillance 
technologies." in Atkinson, P., Glasner, P. and Lock, M. (eds.), Handbook of Genetics and Society. 
Mapping the New Genomic Era, London: Routledge. 
M'charek, A. 2008. "Silent witness, articulate collectives: DNA evidence and the inference of visible 
traits." Bioethics 22: 519-528. 
M'charek, A., Toom, V. and Prainsack, B. 2012. "Bracketing off populations does not advance ethical 
reflection on EVCs." Forensic Science International: Genetics 6: e16-e17. 
Machado, H. and Prainsack, B. 2012. Tracing Technologies: Prisoners' Views in the Era of CSI. Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing. 
Machado, H., Santos, F. and Silva, S. 2011. "Prisoners' expectations of the national forensic DNA 
database: Surveillance and reconfiguration of individual rights." Forensic Science International 210: 
139-143. 
McCartney, C. 2012. "Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets: The Retention of DNA for 
Forensic Purposes." The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 51: 245-260. 
McCartney, C., Williams, R. and Wilson, T. J. 2010. The Future of Forensic Bioinformation. London: 
Nuffield Foundation. 
Accepted for publication in East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal, to appear in 2014. 
23 
 
McCartney, C., Wilson, T. J. and Williams, R. 2011. "Transnational exchange of forensic DNA: viability, 
legitimacy, and acceptability." European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 17: 305-322. 
Mullis, K. B. 1990. "The unusual origin of the polymerase chain reaction." Scientific American 262: 
36-43. 
Murphy, E. 2010. "Relative doubt: Familial searches of DNA databases." Michigan Law Review 109: 
291-348. 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007. The Forensic Uses of Bioinformation: Ethical Issues. London: The 
Nuffield Council. 
O'Dwyer, S. 2003. "Democracy and Confucian values." Philosophy East and West 53: 39-63. 
Ortmann, S. 2011. "Singapore: authoritarian but newly competitive." Journal of Democracy 22: 153-
164. 
Ossorio, P. N. and Duster, T. 2005. "Race and genetics: controversies in biomedical, behavioral, and 
forensic science." American Psychologist 60: 115-128. 
Parliamentary Debates 2004. Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Bill - Second Reading), Col. 388-
407, 1 September 2004. Singapore: Parliament. 
Parven, K. 2012. Forensic Use of DNA Information. Human rights, privacy and other challenges (PhD 
thesis). Wollongong: University of Wollongong. 
Prainsack, B. and Kitzberger, M. 2009. "DNA behind bars: other ways of knowing forensic DNA 
technologies." Social Studies of Science 39: 51-79. 
Prainsack, B. and Toom, V. 2010. "The Prüm regime: Situated dis/empowerment in transnational 
DNA profile exchange." British Journal of Criminology 50: 1117-1135. 
Prainsack, B. and Toom, V. 2013. "Performing the Union: The Prüm Decision and the European 
dream." Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44: 71-79. 
Quek, C. 2009. "DNA records help to solve 350 crimes. Database started six years ago and now has 
100,000 samples (October 9)." The Straits Times. 
Rabinow, P. 1996. Making PCR. A Story of Biotechnology. Chicago & London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Republic of Singapore 2002. "Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act 2002 (No. 45 of 2002)." The 
Government Gazette. 
Scheck, B., Neufeld, P. and Dwyer, J. 2000. Actual Innocence. Five days to execution, and other 
dispatches from the wrongly convicted. New York: Doubleday. 
Schedler, A. 2009. "Electoral authoritarianism." in Landman, T. and Robinson, N. (eds.), The SAGE 
Handbook of Comparative Politics, London: SAGE. 
Accepted for publication in East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal, to appear in 2014. 
24 
 
Siyuan, C. and Chua, E. 2010. "Wrongfull convictions in Singapore: A general survey of risk factors." 
Singapore Law Review 28: 98-123. 
Skinner, D. 2011. "Mobile Identities and Fixed Categories: Forensic DNA and the Politics of Racialised 
Data." in Schramm, K., Skinner, D. and Rottenburg, R. (eds.), Identity Politics After DNA: Re/Creating 
Categories of Difference and Belonging: Re/Creating Categories of Difference and Belonging, New 
York: Berghahn. 
Supreme Court of the United States 2013. Maryland v. King, No 12-207, Decided June 3. Washington 
DC: Supreme Court of the United States. 
Tan-Siew, W. F., Liang-Sung, C. L., Seng, S. L. E., Kim, D. N. K. and Tse, C. S. 2007. The Singapore 
National DNA Database Laboratory. Singapore: Health Sciences Authority. 
Tan, E. K.-B. 2000. "Law and values in governance: the Singapore way." Hong Kong Law Journal 30: 
91-119. 
Toom, V. 2012a. "Bodies of science and law: forensic DNA profiling, biological bodies and biopower." 
Journal of Law and Society 39: 150-166. 
Toom, V. 2012b. "Forensic DNA databases in England and the Netherlands: governance, structure 
and performance compared." New Genetics and Society 31: 311-322. 
USA Congress 2011. Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve Cold Cases Act of 2010, H.R. 6011. 
Washington: House of Representatives. 
Van Houdt, F. and Schinkel, W. 2013. "A genealogy of neoliberal communitarianism." Theoretical 
Criminology Online first: DOI: 10.1177/1362480613485768. 
Williams, R. and Johnson, P. 2004. "Circuits of surveillance." Surveillance and society 2: 1-14. 
Williams, R. and Johnson, P. 2006. "Inclusiveness, effectiveness and intrusiveness: issues in the 
developing uses of DNA profiling in support of criminal investigations." The Journal of Law, Medicine 
& Ethics 34: 234-247. 
Williams, R. and Johnson, P. 2008. Genetic Policing. The Use of DNA in Criminal Investigations. 
Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing. 
Youssef, M. 2009. "DNA database to start in a year (October 7)." The National. 
Yuen-C, T. 2012. "Gan apologises over DNA lab blunder by HSA (5 January) " The Straits Times. 
Zakaria, F. 1994. "Culture is destiny: a conversation with Lee Kuan Yew." Foreign Affairs 73: 109-126. 
 
 
